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In response to the structural shift in oil price coupled with greater import 
dependency, concerns about security of supply have once again emerged 
as a major policy issue.  The UK, the largest producer of oil and natural 
gas in the European Union, became a net importer of natural gas in 2004, 
and, according to Government estimates, will become a net importer of 
oil by the end of the decade.  A weakened North Sea performance means 
extra reliance, both for the UK and Europe as a whole, on global oil and 
gas network and imports.  In 2002, the UK Government introduced a 10 
per cent supplementary charge and in 2005, doubled the charge to 20 per 
cent in an attempt to capture more revenues from the oil industry because 
of the increase in the price of crude oil.  However, higher tax rates do not 
necessarily generate higher fiscal revenue and in the long term may result 
in materially lower revenues if investment is discouraged.  It is therefore 
argued that the increase in the fiscal take came at the wrong time for the 
UK Continental Shelf and that the UK Government’s concern should 
have been to encourage more oil production from its declining province, 
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After reaching an average of $12 per barrel (Brent) in 1998, oil prices began to climb from 
the depressed levels during the last 15 years of the twentieth century to average $54 per barrel 
in 2005 (BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2006).  In response to this structural shift in 
the crude oil price coupled with greater import dependency, concerns about security of supply 
have once again emerged as a major policy issue (Helm, 2005).  The USA, the world’s largest 
oil consumer, identified reduced dependence on imported oil as an urgent energy, economic 
and national security issue that should be tackled principally by promoting the development 
of domestic resources (National Energy Policy Development Group, 2001).  
 
The situation is little different in Europe.  The UK is the largest producer of oil and natural 
gas in the European Union.  However, after years of being a net exporter of both fuels, the 
UK became a net importer of natural gas in 2004, and according to Government estimates the 
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country will become a net importer of oil by the end of the decade (EIA, 2006).  UK’s oil 
production peaked in 1999 at 2.8 million barrel a day (mmbbl/d) (DTI, 2005), but has since 
declined steadily, as the discovery and development of new reserves failed to keep pace with 
the maturation of existing fields (EIA, 2006). In 2004, the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) oil 
production declined 228 million barrel (mmbbl) faster than any other major oil production 
province in the world.  Lower North Sea production has meant additional reliance, both for 
the UK and Europe as a whole, on rising imports.  
 
Security of energy supply is one of the main goals of the UK energy policy, as set out in the 
2003 Energy White Paper “Our Energy Future – Creating a Low Carbon Economy” (DTI, 
2003).  While indigenous production from the UKCS will continue to make an important 
contribution to overall security of energy supply, the UKCS is a mature province and needs 
considerable investment to sustain production.  Loss of investment, rising costs or an 
inappropriate fiscal or regulatory policy could stop this industry dead in its tracks (UKOOA, 
2006). 
 
It is against this background that the recent increase in taxation on upstream oil activity in the 
UK will be examined in this paper.  In 2002, the UK Government introduced a 10% 
supplementary charge on top of the standard 30% Corporation Tax and in 2005, doubled the 
charge to 20%. The latter changes to the North Sea tax regime were introduced in order to 
maintain a balance between oil producers and consumers, by promoting investment and 
ensuring fairness to taxpayers in view of the recent significant increases in oil prices and the 
upwards shift in expectations of the medium term outlook for future oil prices (HM Treasury 
and Customs, 2006).  The Government expected to generate an additional ₤2billion (bn) from 
oil activity in 2006-2007 as a result of the increase in tax.  However, six months after the 
increase in tax, estimates were revised and the UK Government wrote off three-quarters of the 
₤2bn originally expected revenues, in the light of the decreasing North Sea production (Giles 
and Hoyos, 2006).  Then, in the space of further six months following the March 2006 Budget Do High Oil Prices Justify an Increase in Taxation in a Mature Oil Province?  Page 3 of 35 
the UK Government further reduced the yield expectations from the North Sea by £2.8 bn in 
the tax years 2007-8 (HM Treasury, 2006).  This illustrates that an over reliance on North Sea 
tax revenues creates instability in the general tax regime as inherent volatility in North Sea tax 
revenues undermines Budget arithmetic creating the need for tax rises elsewhere in the 
economy if revenue forecasts prove over optimistic. 
 
The objective of this paper is to analyse whether high oil prices justify an increase in taxation 
applying to exploration and production activity in a mature province.  The paper critically 
evaluates the impact of the 2005 fiscal changes on Government revenues and oil field 
profitability and in particular the attractiveness of the regime from an investment standpoint. 
It also examines the way in which the UK Government, through the design of its petroleum 
fiscal regime and the subsequent amendments, has affected the trade-off between the State 
and the oil companies.  
 
Furthermore, the paper presents an up-to-date analysis of petroleum taxation, which from a 
global perspective is the most commonly used mechanism for sharing the benefits of 
petroleum resources between the host Government and the international oil companies (Blinn 
et al, 1986).  In the mid 2000s, many major oil-producing countries suffer from either decline 
or a slow down in production and exploration activity because they failed to implement 
appropriate fiscal regimes (Lee, 2006).  Countries, such as Iraq, are looking for new fiscal 
frameworks in which to develop or restore their oil production sectors.  Although there will 
always be a controversy surrounding how precisely to share “the cake”, the contents of this 
paper suggests a basis for changing or creating a new fiscal structure, by aligning more 
closely the interests of both the Government and the oil industry. 
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 examines the current status of the 
UKCS. Section 3 reviews the controversy surrounding the UK petroleum fiscal regime.   Do High Oil Prices Justify an Increase in Taxation in a Mature Oil Province?  Page 4 of 35 
Section 4 presents the methodology and assumptions used in this paper.  Section 5 
summarises and analyses the main findings.  Section 6 is devoted to the concluding remarks.  
 
 
2.  IMPORTANCE AND REALITY OF THE UKCS 
2.1. Production 
The UK ranks high in the global league of oil and gas producers.  It is a major non-OPEC oil 
producer. In 2006, it had 4.0 billion barrels (bnbbl) of proven crude oil reserves, the most of 
any EU member country (EIA, 2006) and between 16 and 27 bnbbl of oil equivalent of 
overall oil and gas resource potential (UKOOA, 2005). In 2004, the UK produced more oil 
and gas than Venezuela, Nigeria, Indonesia or Kuwait (Crawford, 2006); producing 1.3bnbbl 
of oil and gas from the UKCS, sufficient to provide over 80% of the nation’s total energy 
needs (UKOOA, 2006).  
 
Oil production in the UK peaked in 1999. The Government expects the production decline to 
continue, reaching 1.38mmbbl/d by 2009 (DTI, 2005).  The two main reasons for this decline 
are firstly the overall maturity of UKCS oil fields, and secondly the declining field sizes for 
new discoveries and developments.  Additionally, increasing unit extraction costs, in what is 
acknowledged to be one of the highest cost basins in the world, are damaging project 
economics and basin competitiveness.  A shift of basin production to more remote and 
inhospitable areas of the UKCS is also a factor (DTI, 2005).  Crude oil exports have followed 
a similar path to production albeit that they initially levelled off between 1999 and 2000 
before slowly declining. Crude oil imports have risen steadily to substantially narrow the gap 
with exports although the UK remains a net exporter of crude (DTI, 2005).  Figure 1 
illustrates the trends in production, exports and imports of oil from 1970 to 2004. 
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Figure 1: Production, exports and imports of oil 
 
(Source; DTI, 2005) 
 
2.2. Fields Distribution 
Since 1975, the UKCS has undergone major changes.  One fact that clearly emerges is the 
decline in the average size of fields during the 1990s, compared with the early development 
of the North Sea, as Figure 2 shows.  
 
Figure 2: Average size of oil and gas fields 
 
(Source; DTI, 2005) 
 
A minority of fields account for the majority of aggregate reserves.  The largest five fields 
account for 37%, the largest 10 for 52% and the largest 20 for 71% of the total reserves 
(Watkins, 2000). However, 29 of the UK major UK fields peaked prior to 1994 (DTI, 2005).  
By 2000, they had total oil production declines of more than 50% from their maximum 
production levels (Blanchard, 2000).  
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To counteract the rapid decline of mature fields, new but smaller fields are being brought on-
line at an increasing rate.  From 1985 to 2006, the number of producing fields on the UKCS 
has increased three-fold.  Although it took 25 years for the first 100 fields to be brought on-
line, it took only 6 years to bring the second 100 fields on-line (Blanchard, 2000).  As might 
be expected, however, the fields found during subsequent periods have become progressively 
smaller, with an average discovery size of 25 to 30 mmbbl of oil equivalent. That is small 
compared to the larger UK fields, like Forties and Brent, with an average size above 2,400 
mmboe (Sem and Ellerman, 1997).  Although there is no official definition for fields’ size, 




Table 1: Fields’ classification by size 
Study By  Very Small  Small  Medium  Large 
Robinson & Morgan (1978)     100-250  250-350  >350 
Kemp & Stephens (1997)  <100  100-250  250-500  >500 
Sem & Ellerman (1998)     <100  100-400  >400 
Watkins (2000)     <100 100-400  >400 
Ruairidh (2003)  <100  100-200  200-400  >400 
 
Furthermore, many of the new smaller fields have lifetimes of 10 years or less. In an extreme 
example, Dauntless field was brought on-line in August 1997 and was terminated in April 
1999 (Blanchard, 2000). Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of fields by size, and the 
contribution of those fields to total production.  
 
                                                 
1 Recoverable reserves are "that proportion of the oil and gas in the reservoir that can be removed using 
currently available techniques" (DTI, Oil & Gas Glossary, 2003) Do High Oil Prices Justify an Increase in Taxation in a Mature Oil Province?  Page 7 of 35 
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Contribution to production (2004) in % Proportion from total of 140 fields
 
 
2.2. A Challenging Situation 
Clearly, the UKCS is a mature oil and gas province, which has been in production for nearly 
40 years.  However, this reality does not necessarily mean that "North Sea oil, the precious 
resource that has contributed hundreds of billions of pounds to the UK economy, is now 
slipping into history" (Reuters, 2004, p.1).  Other basins, such as the Gulf of Mexico, have 
undergone similar evolutions and seen activity actually increase, few years after it has been 
declared a “dead sea” (Ruairidh, 2003). 
 
In a survey carried out by Nakhle (2005), 40% of respondents agreed that despite the maturity 
of the UKCS, the UK North Sea era has not ended yet.  Similarly, according to a study carried 
out by UKOOA and WoodMackenzie in 2004, there are still substantial opportunities to be 
accessed if the UK remains internationally competitive and can sustain current investment.  If 
successful the UK could still be producing the equivalent of 65% of its total oil requirements 
in 2020 and delay decommissioning by 10-15 years, making a major contribution to the UK’s 
security of energy supply.  In stark contrast if the UK becomes less attractive to new 
investment, then the UKCS will only provide the equivalent of 15% of total UK oil demand 
by 2020 (UKOOA, 2005).  Consequently, as Figure 4 shows, the UKCS can either face a 
rapid decline, hence exposing the UK to an increasing dependence on oil imports, or 
production can be sustained for a longer period of time, hence extending the benefits to 
                                                 
2 Author’s estimates based on data from DTI (2005) Do High Oil Prices Justify an Increase in Taxation in a Mature Oil Province?  Page 8 of 35 
consumers, companies and Government alike.  The future of the North Sea depends on a 
combination of factors.  The petroleum fiscal regime is a major determinant.  
 
Figure 4: UKOOA UK North Sea Production Scenarios 
 
 
3.  The UK Petroleum Fiscal Regime 
3.1. Importance of the fiscal regime 
In examining the attractiveness of an oil or gas province, a prospective investor will take into 
many factors which include: 
•  Basin prospectivity (the chance of finding oil or gas) 
•  Volumetric potential (how large are the discoveries) 
•  Basin cost structure (overall finding, development and operating costs per billion of 
oil equivalent) 
•  Access to infrastructure and opportunities 
•  The fiscal regime - its evolution, complexity and stability 
The balance of the above factors will enable the investor to assess the basin competitiveness.  
 
In a survey undertaken by Mohiuddin and Ash-Kuri (1998) based on 30 companies, 83% of 
these argue that prospectivity is the most important factor while fiscal terms come second and 
political stability third.  Martin (1997) argues that the changes made to the UK petroleum Do High Oil Prices Justify an Increase in Taxation in a Mature Oil Province?  Page 9 of 35 
fiscal regime are the most important factor that led to the 1985 and 1995 peaks in oil 
production, while technological progress, which came second, is significant only when 
combined with high oil prices.  Similarly, Nakhle (2005) found that, in a mature province, 
taxation is a principal determinant of future levels of activity and profitability. Some 
countries, like Indonesia, with very tough fiscal regimes still attract substantial investments 
because of their favourable prospectivity.  According to Raja (1999), although the UK is 
believed to have a very attractive fiscal regime, Indonesia comes second to the UK in terms of 
the number of wells drilled.  
 
There tends to be a relationship between Government tax take and prospectivity, high take is 
generally sustainable only if the basin offers high volumetric potential.  In the case of the UK, 
the high basin cost structure adds a further dimension.  The volumetric potential is critical for 
large international companies, which need to replace their production with new discoveries 
and or field growth.  In a mature basin such as the UK large discoveries are no longer possible 
and the basin attraction has shifted from volume to value.   
 
The reduced average size of finds in the UKCS coupled with the relatively high costs of 
exploration and development has meant that there is an insufficient resource base to attract 
larger oil company investment particularly when other international opportunities are in keen 
competition for funds (Sassoon, 2003).  In 2002, the UKCS ranked 19
th globally in terms of 
the average commercial discovery size.  Additionally, with $10 a barrel operating costs in the 
UK North Sea compared with $5 in Angola and $6 in Gulf of Mexico, it is going to be harder 
to continue to attract investment in competition with the larger and more commercially 
attractive opportunities available elsewhere in the world (Morgan, 2000).  In the light of such 
developments, taxation could be used as an instrument to compensate for the decreasing 
attractiveness of the UKCS, with respect to prospectivity and costs.  
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3.2. Structure of the UK petroleum fiscal regime 
Petroleum taxation has received considerable attention since the discovery of oil in the 1960s 
in the UK sector of the North Sea.  The structure of the current fiscal regime was first set out 
in a 1974 White Paper and was formally legislated through the Oil Taxation Act of 1975.  The 
regime consisted of three main instruments, Royalty, Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT) and 
Corporation Tax (CT).  At the outset the Government had two key objectives.  These were to 
secure a fairer share of profits for the nation and ensure a suitable return for oil companies on 
their capital investment (Inland Revenue, 2003).  
 
The Royalty rate was fixed at 12.5% on the gross revenues of each field with a deduction for 
conveying and treating costs, which represent the cost of bringing the petroleum ashore and 
its initial treatment.  Royalty was abolished in 1983 on fields that have received development 
consent after 1983, and then abolished on all fields in 2002.  
 
PRT is a special petroleum profits tax assessed on a field-by-field basis with all fields treated 
equally irrespective of ownership. PRT was charged initially at a rate of 45% on the value of 
oil and gas produced.  The tax base broadly equates to revenue receipts less the expenditure 
incurred in developing and operating the field. PRT was introduced to capture economic rent 
from the more profitable fields.  Less profitable projects were shielded from the tax as a result 
of various allowances and reliefs, namely uplift, oil allowance and safeguard.  Uplift is an 
additional allowance equal to 35% of capital expenditures. The oil allowance grants 250,000 
tonnes for each six month to be exempt from PRT up to a cumulative maximum of 5Mt. The 
safeguard provision was introduced to limit the PRT liability in any chargeable period to 80% 
of the amount by which gross profits exceed 15% of cumulative expenditure.  As such, the 
safeguard limited the PRT liability for part of the field’s life and allowed fields to achieve a 
minimum level of return on investment prior to incurring any PRT liability. In 1993, PRT was 
reduced to 50% on existing fields and abolished on all fields receiving development consent 
after April 1993. Incentives for Exploration and appraisal drilling were also removed.  Do High Oil Prices Justify an Increase in Taxation in a Mature Oil Province?  Page 11 of 35 
 
CT was initially set at 52% then reduced to 30% on company profits. Exploration costs were 
deemed fully deductible, while development costs were made subject to various tax 
depreciation allowances.  CT is the standard company tax on profits that applies to all 
companies operating in the UK.  However, in the case of petroleum activity, there is a ring 
fence that prohibits the use of losses from other activities outside the ring fence to reduce the 
profits originating from within the UKCS ring fence.  Nonetheless, losses and capital 
allowances inside the ring fence may be set against income arising outside the ring fence. 
 
In 2002, the UK Government introduced a 10% supplementary charge on profits subject to 
CT. This charge was calculated on the same basis as normal CT, but there was no deduction 
for financing costs.  Additionally, a 100% capital investment allowance was introduced 
against both CT and the supplementary charge, replacing the previous 25% per annum writing 
down allowance.  
 
In 2005, in view of the recent significant increases in oil prices, the upwards shift in 
expectations of the medium term outlook for future oil prices and the dramatic increase in 
public spending, the Government decided to increase the level of the Supplementary Charge 
by 10%, with effect from 1 January 2006.  
 
3.3. Controversy surrounding the UK petroleum fiscal regime 
Since the establishment of the UKCS tax system in 1975, the regime has been repeatedly 
reviewed and many amendments applied.  Rowland and Hann (1987) argue that no other 
sector in the UK economy has been subject to such fiscal instability.  Kemp and Rose (1982) 
argue that a tax system subject to continuous “tinkering” tends to increase political risk and 
reduce the value placed by investors on future income streams.  
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In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the UK Government leaned towards generating high 
revenues from the oil industry, whereas from 1983 to 2002, the emphasis was on encouraging 
new developments and increasing production.  These various changes have generated much 
controversy. Researchers and specialists have either criticised or defended the regime 
following each change, with extreme views being expressed.  For example, Bland (1988) 
describes the UKCS fiscal regime as a patchwork of separate taxes, each amended and 
adjusted in response to changing circumstances and forming less than a cohesive whole. In 
concurring with Bland, Rutledge and Wright (1998) describe the fiscal regime in the UK as 
the weakest in the world.  Opposing such views, Martin (1997) argues that Government 
action, in particular that in 1983 and 1993, was responsible for the two production peaks in 
the pattern of the UKCS oil production. Johnston (2003) debates that although Government 
actions since 1983 appeared crazy and irresponsible they led to hyperactivity in the UK sector 
of the North Sea and made the UK offshore the most active offshore province in the world. 
  
The controversy surrounding the UK petroleum fiscal regime and its various amendments 
arises from the need to balance the two chief but competing objectives of taxation. These are 
to capture a large share of economic rent while stimulating private investment in the sector 
(Bond, et al, 1987). Further, since there is no objective yardstick for sharing economic wealth 
between the various interests involved in the petroleum activity, controversy will always 
prevail.  A trade off will always exist, since both Government and oil companies want to 
maximise their own rewards.  Mercier (1999) argues that tax rates that are set too low leave 
the Government, the owner of the resource, a small and inequitable portion.  Yet, if tax rates 
are too high, investment will be discouraged, not only in new projects, but in sustaining the 
capital investment required to maximise future value added from existing operations 
(Crowson, 2004). 
 
However, the exploration and exploitation of oil requires significant financial resources. 
Further, the high risk involved, as a result of geology and oil price volatility, renders a purely Do High Oil Prices Justify an Increase in Taxation in a Mature Oil Province?  Page 13 of 35 
national approach to the exploitation of petroleum difficult.  "Exploration and exploitation 
activities present delicate legal, technical, financial and political problems and any solution 
requires a balancing act between the respective interests of the producing countries and the oil 
companies" (Blinn et al, 1986, p.15).  In the absence of a healthy and financially successful 
oil industry, the Government cannot realize the full benefit of resource extraction (Watkins, 
2001).  
 
That said such a trade-off could be improved if an appropriate tax system is adopted. Such a 
regime can generate a positive rather than a zero-sum outcome.  In the former, both the 
Government and investors benefit respectively from a fair share of revenues and appropriate 
profitability whereas, in the latter, the return to Government cannot be increased without 
reducing the incentive to private firms (Stauffer and Gault, 1985).  The analysis below 
evaluates the extent to which the UK Government has succeeded in establishing a suitable 
regime that generates a fair share of revenues for themselves whilst simultaneously providing 
sufficient incentives to encourage investment, in a mature, declining province.  
 
 
4.  METHODOLOGY AND ASSUMPTIONS  
4.1. Economic rent 
Dickson (1999) defines economic rent as "the true value of the natural resource, the difference 
between the revenues generated from resource extraction and the costs of extraction; these 
costs include the costs of employing factors of production and their opportunity costs" (p.1).  
Similarly, Banfi, et al (2003) define economic rent as "the surplus return above the value of 
the capital, labour and other factors of production employed to exploit the resource.  It is the 
surplus revenue of the resource after accounting for the costs of capital and labour inputs" 
(p.2).  In addition to the capital and labour inputs referred to, further inputs in respect of 
entrepreneurial reward and risk taking need to be incorporated.  
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Consequently, economic rent can best be considered as "a bonus, a financial return not 
required to motivate desired economic behavior" (Raja, 1999, p.2).  In this sense, previous 
studies presume a tax based on economic rent is an ideal tax (Dickson, 1999).  Since the 
magnitude of such profits is not relevant to economic decisions, they constitute a justifiable 
base for taxation (Rowland and Hann, 1987).  Furthermore, if the tax seeks to capture 
economic rent, then the tax-take falls when economic rent decreases and rises when it 
increases. As such, the tax base responds in the appropriate direction to variations in costs and 
crude oil prices (Kemp, et al 1997).  Kemp and Rose (1982) argue that a stable system 
increases the possibility of substantial economic rent, while Rowland and Hann (1987) 
maintain that a fair progressive tax, aimed at absorbing economic rent, is neutral and stable.  
 
In their definition of economic rent generated from petroleum extraction activity in the UK 
North Sea, Rowland and Hann (1987) provide a practical measure of that rent.  "The 
economic worth of a license to produce oil from a tract of the UKCS may be measured by the 
present value of the flow of the future revenues from that tract's production less the present 
value of associated future costs, where the costs include monetary items such as equipment as 
well as non-monetary items such as exposure to risks.  The difference between these two 
amounts, the net present value (NPV), is the economic rent of that tract.  It may be positive, 
negative or zero. If it is positive, it implies that the licensee is enjoying profits in excess of 
those necessary to induce the production of petroleum (pure profits)" (p.4).  Similarly, Raja 
(1999) argue that taxes should be aimed at taxing positive NPV because the NPV method 
discounts all future cash flows and incorporates all the relevant rewards to factors of 
production.  
 
4.2. Evaluation technique 
To value oil fields’ profitability, the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) technique is adopted here. 
This technique involves three steps. Firstly, the field’s project net cash flows that will occur at 
each time period in a particular scenario are estimated. Secondly, the project cash flows are Do High Oil Prices Justify an Increase in Taxation in a Mature Oil Province?  Page 15 of 35 
discounted using a certain discount rate, incorporating a risk premium.  Finally, the 
discounted cash flows are added to form the project value, also called the Net Present Value 
(NPV) (Jacoby and Laughton, 1992).  
 
The DCF technique has been (and still is) the most commonly used method in evaluating 
expected future cash flow.  It is usually used by oil companies (Emhjellen and Alaouze, 2001) 
and a study undertaken by Siew (2001) found that 99% of oil companies use this technique 
because it is a cash flow based technique, which takes into account the time value of money 
and it is quick and relatively easy to understand and calculate.  Furthermore, the majority of 
previous studies
3 utilized this traditional technique to evaluate the profitability of an oil field.  
To value their projects, oil companies estimate the after tax present value of their total 
expected net cash flows discounted for both time and risk.  For the purpose of the analysis 
carried out in this paper, the discount rate is assumed to be 10% in real terms, as applied in 
the majority of published studies
4, to mirror the industry's discount rate. 
 
4.3. Assumptions 
Different sizes of fields generate different levels of profitability.  In relative terms, small and 
medium fields do not generate the same levels of economic rent as large fields.   
Consequently, different tax instruments have a varying impact on field profitability in so far 
as ‘one size does not fit all’.  To illustrate this variable impact, a sample of oil fields is 
selected and classified according to the size of their recoverable reserves into very small, 
small, medium, large and very large categories, as in the following:  
 
                                                 
3 Among others, Robinson & Morgan (1978), Rowland & Hann (1987), Kemp & Rose (1982), Kemp 
& Stephens (1997), and Martin (1997). 
4 See Kemp & Rose (1982), Rowland & Hann (1987), Kemp & Stephens (1997), Martin (1997) and 
Bradley (1998). Do High Oil Prices Justify an Increase in Taxation in a Mature Oil Province?  Page 16 of 35 
Table 2: Fields Size 
Fields Size  Recoverable reserves (mmbbl) 
Very Small  <100 
Small 100-200 
Medium   200-400 
Large 400-500 
Very Large  >500 
 
A sample of 25 oil fields is selected for investigation on the basis of their providing a 
representative sample of post 1993 (pre-2004) producing oil fields in the UK North Sea
5.  
Quota sampling is used to ensure that unit subgroups are represented in the sample in 
approximately the same proportions as they are represented in the population (Ghauri, et al. 
1995).  
 
For the purpose of this analysis, the data set includes 10 very small, 9 small, 4 medium and 2 
large fields.  No very large fields are incorporated in the analysis because there has not been 
any UK discovery of this size for the last 20 years.  Further, the very large fields that are in 
production are currently in their final stages of decline.  
 
Six tax scenarios are adopted.  These, with the exception of Scenario 0 (the base pre-tax 
scenario) are used to calculate profitability, Government revenues and take under different 
combinations of tax instruments and tax rates.  They are summarised in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Tax Scenarios 
Scenarios Package  (%)  Marginal rate  Period Application 
   CT  ST  PRT  (%)    
S0 0  0  0  0   Pre-tax  base 
S1  30 0 50  65  pre-02  on fields that received development consent before 93 
S2 30  10  0  40  02/05  on fields that received development consent after 93 
S3 30  20  0  50  Post 05  on fields that received development consent after 93 
S4 30  10  50  70  02/05  on fields that received development consent before 93 
S5 30  20  50  75  Post 05  on fields that received development consent before 93 
 
                                                 
5 Except Argyll field, which was decommissioned in 1992, but it is included in the fields’ sample as a 
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Oil fields’ profitability and Government revenues are further evaluated under two price 
scenarios: 
-  A low oil price scenario, where a $19.5/barrel Brent price is assumed in the base year 
(2000).  This value represents the average oil price achieved in the 1990s. It also 
represents the low case scenario assumed by the EIA (2006) in its oil price expectations 
for 2020. 
-  A high oil price scenario, taking into consideration the average annual Brent prices 
achieved in 2000-2005 ($28.5 in 2000, $24.4 in 2001, $25 in 2002, $28.8 in 2003, $38.7 
in 2004 and $54.3 in 2005 (BP Statistical Review, 2005).  
 
These two scenarios are considered because on the one hand, the increase in oil price 
triggered the increase in taxation on oil activity in the UK (HM Treasury, 2005) and on the 
other hand, oil companies do not base their investment decisions on assumptions of $50/barrel 
but far less (Crawford, 2006).  According to UKOOA (2005), in response to the recent 
increase in oil prices, companies have raised the prices they use to evaluate new investment 
opportunities. 
 
The analysis is undertaken in nominal terms and subsequently deflated.  All figures are 
expressed in million US$ and in real terms, assuming a constant annual inflation rate of 2.5% 
as from 2000.  The inflation rate used represents the UK Retail Price Index and the five years 
average US deflator (Bank of England, 2006).  Furthermore, a constant exchange rate of 
US$1.6 = £1STG is used and which represents the five years average exchange rate (2000-
2005) (Barclays Bank, 2006).  Due to the individual characteristics of each oil field, such as 
water depth, size, costs and life, which are specific to each field, an Excel spreadsheet 
particular to each oil field was developed.  
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5.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1. Results 
It is not surprising to see that the profitability of each field has decreased under all tax 
scenarios.  However, while higher tax rates are expected to generate lower profitability, such 
an outcome does not apply in the case of very small and small fields when PRT applies. For 
instance, by taking into consideration tax rates only, a combination of 30% CT and 20% ST 
(50% marginal tax rate) is expected to generate a higher profitability than a combination of 
30% CT and 50% PRT (S1, 65% marginal tax rate) or even still a combination of 30% CT, 
10% ST and 50% PRT (S4, 70% marginal tax rate).  However this does not apply to the 
smaller fields. In the case of 11 fields out of 19 very small and small fields, a combination of 
50% PRT and 30% CT (S1) generates a higher profitability than a combination of 30% CT 
and 10% ST (S2, 40% marginal tax rate).  
 
The largest decrease in profitability of all fields occurs under the combination of 50% PRT, 
30% CT and 20% ST (S5, 75% marginal tax rate), highlighting that the impact of the 2005 
fiscal changes significantly impact the profitability of the fields that are still paying PRT. For 
medium and larger fields, a more consistent pattern can be noted.  In general, the highest 
profitability is achieved under a 30% CT and 10% ST (S2), followed by 50% PRT and 30% 
CT (S1), except for one medium field, Tern, where a combination of 50% PRT and 30% CT 
(S1) generates the highest profitability.  In the case of large fields, tax packages based on 
income tax only (CT and ST) generate a higher profitability than those where PRT applies.  
Figure 5 summarises the differing impact of various tax packages on different fields’ size. 
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Under the high oil price scenario, all fields (except one) have NPV higher than ₤100 million. 
Janice is the only oil field which has a negative NPV under all tax scenarios except where 
50% PRT and 30% CT apply.  
 
The story is different under the low oil price scenario, where a significant decrease in fields’ 
profitability is noted.  Under this scenario, five very small and three small fields suffer from 
decrease in profitability to below ₤30 million. Furthermore, a combination of 50% PRT and 
30% CT (S1, 65% marginal tax rate) generates a very similar profitability as 30% CT and 
10% ST (S2, 40% marginal tax rate).  In fact, under the low oil price scenario, an increase in 
ST on fields led to a negative NPV in the case of two small fields.  Figure 6 summarises the 
impact of the fiscal packages on the profitability of the four fields’ groups. 
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In terms of Government revenues, the lowest fiscal take is generated under the combination of 
50% PRT and 30% CT (S1) for very small and small fields (with one exception), followed by 
30% CT and 10% ST (S2).  The highest take is generated under a combination of 30% CT, 
50% PRT and 30% ST (S5), followed by 30% CT and 20% ST (S3).  However, in the case of 
medium and large fields, the larger fiscal takes are generated where PRT applies, and the 
lowest where only CT and ST apply. Figure 7 summarises the total Government take from 
various fields’ groups under high price scenario.  
 
Figure 7: Total Government take from different fields under different tax 
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Under the low oil price scenario, there is a significant decrease in government revenues.  A 
combination of 30% CT and 10% ST generate the same amount as provided by 50% PRT and 
30% CT when applied to medium fields.  But in general the latter package generates the 
lowest fiscal take in the case of smaller fields (with one exception), as shown in Figure 8.  
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Both Figure 7 and Figure 8 show that the revenues generated from 10 very small fields are by 
less than those generated from only two large fields.  
 
In terms of Government take, expressed as a percentage of the pre-tax NPV of a field, the 
following can be noted.  Where PRT applies, the effective marginal tax rate is much lower 
than the imposed rate, especially in the case of very small and small fields.  For instance, 
under S1 (30% CT and 50% PRT) where the marginal tax rate is supposed to be 65%, the 
effective tax rate barely reaches 42% for very small fields, while the rate varies between 30-
56% for small fields, under both high and low price scenarios.  For larger fields, the rate is 
higher; 53-55% for medium fields and around 60% for large fields.  As such, the outcome is 
similar to imposing 30% CT with 10% ST (S2) and even 30% CT with 20% ST (S3), with 
respective marginal tax rate of 40% and 50%.  Similarly, imposing 50% PRT with 30% CT 
and 10% ST (S4, 70% marginal tax rate), the effective marginal tax rate varies between 40-
55% on very small fields, 38%- 50% on small fields, 54-60% on medium fields and reaches 
60% in the case of larger fields.  Again the outcome is not very different from the scenarios 
where CT and ST only apply.  
 
The effective tax rates are higher under a combination of 50% PRT, 30% CT and 20% ST 
(S6, 75% marginal tax rate), where tax rate varies between 50%-60% on very small and small 
fields, and 60%-69% on medium fields.  The full marginal tax rate is captured in the case of 
one large field only – Schiehallion – under the low price scenario and where the effective 
marginal tax rate reaches 75%. No striking differences were noted in the marginal tax rates 
under the two selected price scenarios, especially where CT and ST apply (S2 and S4); in 
general small differences occurred where PRT applies.  This outcome can be attributed to the 
neutral aspect of the fiscal packages.  Among all these findings, there are two exceptions; the 
Janice field, which shows very high effective marginal tax rates as the field has a negative 
NPV, and Auk field, which is a small but with a long production profile and all fiscal Do High Oil Prices Justify an Increase in Taxation in a Mature Oil Province?  Page 22 of 35 
packages seem to be regressive as the marginal tax rates are significantly higher under the low 
price scenario compared with the high price scenario.  
 
5.2. Discussion 
In 1998, the UK Government proposed either to re-introduce PRT at a rate of 50% in addition 
to the 30% CT on fields that received development consent after 1993, or to apply a 
supplementary charge to the 30% CT. In 2002, it opted for the latter option and further 
increased the rate of ST in 2005, in the light of the higher oil prices in order to capture a 
larger share of the resulting economic rents. Several questions arise from such a decision: 
Was it the most appropriate? What impact would a re-introduction of PRT have generated on 
both oil fields’ profitability and Government revenues? Or is the abolition of PRT 
recommended given the maturity of the North Sea? 
 
As the results in the previous section show, PRT is better adapted to the size of oil fields than 
ST. It generates a higher profitability and lower revenues to the Government in the case of 
smaller fields than in the case of larger fields, as compared to packages where CT and ST 
apply. PRT has such an impact on smaller fields principally as a result of the oil allowance, 
which exempts a fixed amount of production from each field from PRT until the total oil 
allowance for the field is fully utilized.  The oil allowance is the most important relief for 
smaller fields. The effects of the other PRT reliefs, namely the Uplift and Safeguard, depend 
mainly on the value of the capital expenditures (CAPEX) as well as the payback period.  As 
the larger fields tend to have a longer payback period and larger CAPEX spend than the 
smaller ones, the Uplift and Safeguard reliefs are of greater significance. Nevertheless, the oil 
allowance is also important for the larger fields, which have the capacity to maximise all of 
the available allowance because of their high levels production. More importantly, the fiscal 
scenarios where PRT applies automatically capture the increased profitability resulting from 
oil price increases, without the need to alter the PRT rate.  This shows that PRT adjusts more 
flexibly to changes in oil price than CT or ST.  Do High Oil Prices Justify an Increase in Taxation in a Mature Oil Province?  Page 23 of 35 
 
The abolition of PRT on fields that received development consent after 1993 generated much 
controversy.  Zhang (1995) argues that the abolition of PRT in 1993 resulted from either a 
weakness in UK Government planning or because of unseen distortions.  Kemp and Stephens 
(1997) maintain that PRT was almost neutral and efficient despite the high marginal rates of 
tax on oil revenues when all allowances were exhausted.  The authors further argue that PRT 
was progressive in relation to variations in the oil price and development costs.  Similarly, 
Kemp et al (1997) argue that PRT could collect a share of economic rents from fields without 
necessarily endangering the viability of a development project; “it is progressive on its impact 
on profits” (p.117). In agreement with such a view, Mommer (1999) also argues that PRT is 
the main excess profit collecting device in the UK, and its several reliefs "ensure that PRT 
cannot, even accidentally, cut into the normal profits to which the companies are entitled" 
(p.15).  Miller et al (2000) propose that the UK Government should re-impose PRT on the 
exempt oil fields at the 50% rate.  
 
Consequently, one wonders why the UK Government firstly abolished PRT in 1993 and 
secondly did not consider re-introducing PRT as a mechanism to capture higher revenues 
from oil activity in the UKCS. PRT suffers from several limitations.  Authors like Devereux 
and Morris (1983) and Bond et al. (1987) previously related the main weakness of PRT to its 
imposition alongside Royalties and CT, both of which are distortionary instruments.   
However, it is unlikely that PRT would be applied without CT since oil companies in the UK 
are expected to pay the same corporation tax as all other companies in other sectors. The two 
other major problems with PRT are firstly, its limited capability to generate high fiscal 
revenues in the case of smaller fields or a low oil price and secondly its complicated structure 
and according to Robinson and Morgan (1978), "it is a complicated device and could be 
abandoned" (p.201). 
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The Government action in 1993 was driven in part by the need to raise revenues and stem the 
losses from PRT.  In the period 1991-93 the Government discovered that the PRT yield had 
been virtually eliminated by the expenditure on exploration and certain large investments in 
large PRT paying fields. According to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, PRT is an expensive 
tax that cost the Exchequer an estimated £200M in 1991 and 1992 (Inland Revenue, 2000). 
When the government removed the exploration allowance against PRT revenues were 
immediately restored.  The three main PRT reliefs- Uplift, Oil Allowance and Safeguard are 
"equally important weaknesses" (Rutledge and Wright, 2000, p.5). Kemp (1990) had 
previously raised the issue that the uplift provision encouraged more capital-intensive 
exploitation methods than would a neutral scheme and the interaction of this allowance with 
the Safeguard provision meant that gold-plating incentives could occur.  
 
Therefore, the reintroduction of PRT would have presented many practical and administrative 
problems, which probably explains why the UK Government did not pursue this option.   
Specifically the large number of fields developed since 1993 (when PRT was abolished) 
would have been brought back into PRT necessitating retroactive PRT field determinations 
(ring fence coordinates) and the creation of a virtual PRT economic history, which would 
have produced inevitable complexity in respect of transition rules.  
 
There are also divided views with respect to CT and ST. Robinson and Morgan (1978) 
maintain that a tax applied on total company profits from UKCS activities is an appropriate 
instrument.  The authors argue that companies can adjust their operations so as to improve the 
after-tax returns on high-cost projects, rather than dealing with single fields as is the case with 
PRT.  Raja (1999) emphasizes the neutral aspect of CT and describes the UK regime based 
solely on CT as an example of a highly neutral tax regime.  Also, Beckman (1998) argues that 
CT is simple to administer and in fact is the simplest way for the Government to raise 
revenues from E&P companies.  Nakhle (2005) found that in the light of the decreasing 
attractiveness of the UKCS, the intellectual case for additional special petroleum taxation is Do High Oil Prices Justify an Increase in Taxation in a Mature Oil Province?  Page 25 of 35 
not sustainable, and that an application of CT only ensures that the upstream industry is 
treated in the same way as any other industry in the UK.  However, Devereux and Morris 
(1983), Kemp and Stephens (1997), Rutledge and Wright (1998) disagree arguing that CT has 
an inappropriate tax base, which does not capture economic rent.  
 
 
6.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Government and oil companies are the principal players in the upstream sector of petroleum 
industry, but their individual focus is one of competing rather than complementary objectives.  
Governments normally seek to generate high levels of take from oil related activity while oil 
companies want to ensure an acceptable and sufficient level of profitability in their 
operations.  Since taxation removes a considerable slice of the producers’ profits, oil 
companies prefer fiscal systems that result in a low overall tax level thereby allowing high 
post-tax returns.  The challenge is to design a fiscal regime that meets those two competing 
objectives.  Further, several complications are associated with petroleum taxation.  
 
The principal source of complication is related to the determination of economic rent. 
Measuring economic rent requires knowledge of the differing costs of the individual factors 
of production as well as their opportunity costs.  The difficulty in measuring each of these 
components is what makes the determination of economic rent and its capture difficult and 
controversial (Banfi, et al, 2003).  Further, as Kemp and Rose (1982) argue, because the size 
of a given discovery and its related exploitation costs can vary substantially, economic rent 
will vary from field to field.  Although this problem can be partly overcome by a progressive 
tax system, it is difficult to make conventional fiscal systems sufficiently flexible and focused 
on resource rent. 
 
An ideal tax exists just in theory, but is a useful paradigm against which to test actual or 
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there is no objective yardstick that determines sharing the oil wealth between the Government 
and the industry.  But fiscal terms could be tailored in such a way as to be attractive for both 
for large as well as small discoveries while safeguarding the economic long-term interests of 
the oil companies.  From the analysis carried out in this paper, on balance, the following 
points emerge: 
 
i.  Firstly, stability of the regime should be delivered. Stability is an intangible yet 
crucial attribute of a fiscal regime.  It directly affects the confidence of investors in 
Government policy, particularly in the case of petroleum extraction activity, where 
long-term projects are the norm. Typically a project life cycle may last 20 to 30 years 
from the first exploration discovery through appraisal, development, production and 
removal.  The project will have to be sufficiently robust to endure many commodity 
price cycles during its life cycle. Fiscal policy, which focuses on ‘creaming off’ rent 
at the peak of the each cycle whilst ignoring the pain of the troughs, is unlikely to 
attract and sustain a basin’s full investment potential.  A study carried out by HM 
Treasury found that the majority of companies included in the study (29 of 37) 
believe that increases in taxation depress exploration activity.  Lack of confidence in 
the future attractiveness of the fiscal regime was cited as the second most significant 
factor restricting exploration, following the global competition for limited funds 
(Sassoon, 2003). 
 
Regime modifications should not be undertaken on a frequent basis nor be of a major 
or structural nature nor undertaken without advanced warning, as they could 
negatively affect investors’ confidence (Nakhle, 2005).  Oil prices are volatile and it 
is almost impossible to track every change. This explains why several authors have 
criticised the UK Government for changing the regime in response to upward 
movements in crude oil prices.  For instance, Rowland (1983) describes such 
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operates, of the factors affecting the oil industry and of the burdens imposed by the 
cumbersome North Sea tax structure" (p.202), while Watkins (2001) argues that the 
number of modifications to which the UK fiscal regime has been subjected are "a 
testimony to its clumsiness" (p.13).  As the previous section showed, a fall in the oil 
price can generate a significant decrease in oil fields’ profitability.  Therefore, if the 
UK Government introduced the 2002 fiscal changes based on the high oil prices, they 
have to address the corollary that it should reduce the tax rates if oil prices fall. 
Perhaps, a wiser policy should accept that short-term fluctuations in oil prices should 
not be the basis for the application of fiscal changes.  
 
ii.  Secondly, the UK fiscal regime suffers from several deficiencies, not least the 
inability of a fiscal package based on CT and ST to adjust automatically to changes in 
the oil price, without structural changes being made.  Furthermore, the complexity 
resulting from the application of two different packages in the UKCS - 50% for new 
fields since 1993 but 75% on many older fields developed before 1993 - distorts 
decision making and tend to divert investment away from the 75% regime towards 
the 50% regime.  But those investments are needed to sustain the production from 
older, larger fields and prolong the life of the province.  
 
Therefore, the UK Government could consider the following two options.  The first 
option is the abolishing of ST and the re-introduction of PRT at a 50% rate.   
However, such a step would lead to lower fiscal revenues generated if there is a 
decrease in oil price and a reduction in the output of larger fields.  Furthermore, 
because the UKCS is a mature province with the majority of fields falling into the 
small and very small categories, PRT is unlikely to generate high fiscal revenues. 
PRT can also lead to an inefficient allocation of expenditures because of its various 
reliefs and can actually give rise to investment disincentives in larger fields.  
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This leads to the second option, which is to abolish PRT on all fields and apply a 
higher ST rate.  This would simplify the tax regime and treat all fields and all basin 
investment on the same basis, as well as possibly generating higher revenues.  From 
the industry’s perspective, PRT abolition would be controversial as it would be 
divisive; some companies pay lots of PRT, others pay none.  The losers would 
complain and the winners would keep quiet.  The Government will also need to 
consider the decommissioning reliefs for PRT if the tax is abolished. 
 
iii.  Thirdly, limiting the evaluation of a fiscal regime to the level of tax rates can be very 
restrictive.  One cannot make judgement about the effectiveness or strengths of a 
fiscal regime, simply by looking at the tax rate. Several factors, such as fiscal reliefs 
and the process of calculating the tax base, can lead to significant differences among 
fiscal packages, while same targets can be achieved with different structures and 
regimes. 
  
iv.  Finally, a high level of Government take is not recommended in cases of high-risk 
exploration and high-cost development, or for those provinces with remaining modest 
petroleum potential, as is the case in the UKCS.  The cost of producing oil can 
overwhelm any price incentive.  Large price incentives are needed to increase 
production while the costs of production are rising.  In the UKCS, there are still 
substantial volumes to come.  But this requires very large investment, given the rising 
costs and the shrinking of fields’ size.  Besides, the UK Government’s priority should 
be to extend the life of its oil province (Nakhle, 2005).  Even at lower oil price, the 
Government can generate higher revenues if production is sustained.  The rapid 
increase in production during the 1990’s resulted in a sharp increase in tax revenues 
despite the static oil price, which averaged under $20/bbl. 
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The appropriate regime would improve the profitability of marginal fields in order to 
persuade oil companies to develop these discoveries.  The application of a 10% ST 
might have not led to a decrease in activity in the UKCS because it was coupled with 
an abolition of Royalty - a regressive tax - in 2002, plus an increase in oil price and 
unattractive conditions in other major oil producing provinces, such as Venezuela, 
Nigeria or the Middle East, for various political reasons.  However, should oil prices 
fall or political stability be restored in provinces well endowed with large, low cost 
oil fields oil companies are likely to divert their interests from the UKCS, especially 
if adverse changes in tax are further introduced and the continued maturity of the 




This paper examines the effects of the 2005 increase in taxation on oil related activity in the 
UKCS, introduced as a consequence of the rise in the crude oil price in 2004.  The analysis 
focuses on the impact of such changes on field profitability and Government revenue, using a 
sample of UKCS oil fields.  The implications of such an analysis are applicable to the global 
oil industry, but in the UK the issue is especially important in the mid 2000s.  As long as oil 
remains a major source of energy and as long as the UKCS continues to produce oil, the issue 
of the tax ‘take’ and the balance between Government desire for revenue and the industry’s 
appetite for investment coupled with attractive returns, will remain central to the public 
debate.  
 
The UK Government has two key objectives from its petroleum fiscal regime.  These are to 
ensure that an appropriate share of UKCS oil profits is taxed whilst continuing to maintain 
industry interest in future production from the UKCS. These objectives go in parallel with the 
two principal aims of oil taxation. On the one hand, oil taxation needs to capture a large share 
of economic rent, while on the other it needs to stimulate private investment in the sector.  Do High Oil Prices Justify an Increase in Taxation in a Mature Oil Province?  Page 30 of 35 
 
Controversy arises from the need to balance these two competing objectives.  In the late 
1970s and early 1980s, the UK Government leant towards generating high revenues from the 
oil industry.  From 1983 to 2002 the emphasis was on encouraging new developments and 
growing production thereby extending a period of UK self-sufficiency.  Then, after 2002, 
squeezing out more revenues from the UKCS became once again a high priority given the 
need to fund a rapid growth in public expenditure.  However, this came at the wrong time in 
the life of the UKCS, since the Government’s concern should have been to encourage more 
oil production from its declining province, especially in the light of the rising concern 
surrounding the security of supply (Nakhle, 2005). In fact, it seems strange to hear Britain’s 
Chancellor demanding more oil from OPEC (BBC 2004, 2005) when adjustment to his own 
tax policies could give a large boost to production right on his doorstep.  UK Government 
fiscal policies have presided over a steep decline in UKCS production; from a peak of 4.6 
million barrel of oil equivalent per day (mmboe) in 1999 it is expected that this will have 
fallen to 3mmboe per day in 2006 a decline of 35% one of the highest basin decline rates in 
the history of the industry (Hall, 2006).  
 
Oil prices have been highly volatile over the past 25 years.  Indeed periods of price volatility 
can be expected in the future principally because of unforeseen political and economic 
circumstances, demand/supply imbalances and lengthening lead times of many new upstream 
projects in deep water and remote locations.  Uncertainty regarding future global oil resources 
and economics is so significant that the EIA (2005) considers a wide range of potential world 
oil price paths, which in 2030 range from $34 to $96 per barrel. Short-term oil prices change 
generally in response to 'news'.  As such they rarely take account of the supply/demand 
balance, which in any case is unknown at the time (Mabro, 2001).  Consequently, using the 
oil price as the basis for taxation is simply inappropriate, especially in a mature province like 
the UKCS. 
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Typically, petroleum extraction activity is characterized by long-term projects.  New oil field 
developments take 2-7 years to bring into production and will be producing for 10 – 25 years. 
Consequently, such investment decisions are not driven by short-term oil and gas price 
movements, but instead by the longer-term perspective on prices (UKOOA, 2005).  This 
further emphasises the importance of stability. Although the UK offers a stable political 
environment, the petroleum fiscal regime has witnessed frequent amendments.  This has 
adversely affected confidence especially in that not all the changes can be described as 
substantial.  
 
It has been argued that the UK fiscal regime suffers from technical deficiencies.  However, on 
balance, if changes are inevitable and in order to sustain production from the UKCS as long 
as possible, the Government should consider abolishing PRT on those fields that received 
development consent before 1993 and maintain the stability of a regime based solely on 
corporation tax.  This is particularly important given that production in the UKCS 
increasingly depends on smaller, high costs fields, future oil prices are almost impossible to 
predict, and in a mature province like the UKCS economic rents are likely to decrease. 
Inevitably, as production continues to decline and unit extraction costs rise, tax capacity will 
be squeezed out of the basin and fiscal policy will need to respond swiftly to sustain 
competitiveness.  In time both PRT and ST will need to be removed returning the basin to the 
same tax regime as applies to the rest of UK Industry. This is nothing new and prevailed in 
the period 1993-2002 when 30% CT applied on fields that received development consent after 
1993. The success of such a fiscal policy is clear from the statistics; a period of rapid 
production growth, sustained investment and rising tax receipts in an environment of oil 
prices averaging below $20/bbl. 
 
The analysis carried out in this paper focused on the impact of the UKCS fiscal changes on 
fields that have been developed.  The analysis could be expanded to incorporate the impact of 
the fiscal changes on exploration activity, taking into consideration the next generation of Do High Oil Prices Justify an Increase in Taxation in a Mature Oil Province?  Page 32 of 35 
fields and the need to look at risk-reward balance, where rewards must be seen to balance 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS: 
bbl: Abbreviation of one barrel of oil. 
b/d: Abbreviation of Barrel per day 
bn: Abbreviation of Billion. 
bnbbl: Abbreviation of Billion of Barrels 
bnbbloe: Abbreviation of  Billion Barrels of oil equivalent. 
bnt: Abbreviation of Billion Tonnes 
Boe: Barrel of Oil Equivalent 
CT: Abbreviation of Corporation Tax 
DCF: Abbreviation of Discount Cash Flow Technique. 
E&P: Abbreviation of Exploration and Production. 
M: Abbreviation of Million. 
mmbbl: Abbreviation of Million Barrels 
mmbbl/d: Abbreviation of Million Barrels per day 
mmboe: Abbreviation of Million Barrels Oil Equivalent. 
Mt: Abbreviation of Million Tonnes. 
Mboe: Million barrel of oil equivalent 
PRT: Abbreviation of Petroleum Revenue Tax 
STG: Abbreviation of British Sterling 
UKCS: Abbreviation of United Kingdom Continental Shelf 
   
Note: 
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